Hungarian Labour Costs Rose 68% in Five Years. Greek Costs Rose 9%.
Silver Data Lab Research Desk · Statistical analysis · Published on 07 August 2026
- Data source
- Eurostat
- Reference period
- 2025
- Last updated
- 25 August 2026
Key estimates
- EU unit labour costs in 2025 stood at 119.6 against a 2020 base of 100 — 19.6% higher in five years.
- Hungary records 167.6, Romania 158.9, Bulgaria 157.5 and Lithuania 153.8.
- Greece records 108.5, Denmark 111.3 and Cyprus 111.8.
- The gap between Hungary and Greece is 59 index points over the same five years.
- Rapid cost growth is concentrated in the Member States that were catching up fastest on wages.

Cost per unit of output, not cost per hour
Unit labour cost is what an employer pays in labour for each unit of output produced. It rises when pay grows faster than productivity and falls when productivity grows faster than pay.
That construction is what makes it the standard measure of cost competitiveness. A country whose wages double while output per worker also doubles has unchanged unit labour costs and is no less competitive than before.
Across the EU, unit labour costs in 2025 stood at 119.6 against a 2020 base of 100.
The catching-up group
Hungary records 167.6, Romania 158.9, Bulgaria 157.5 and Lithuania 153.8. Four Member States more than half again above their 2020 level.
These are among the Union's lower-wage economies, and part of what the index is capturing is convergence: wages rising from a low base towards western European levels. That is the intended outcome of economic integration and not in itself a problem.
It becomes a problem when it outpaces productivity, which is what the index measures. A cost increase of 57% over five years requires productivity growth that few economies achieve, and where it has not been matched, the country's exports become more expensive relative to its competitors.
Within a currency union this cannot be corrected by devaluation, which is why the measure sits in the imbalance framework. Hungary and Romania are outside the euro area and retain that option. Bulgaria gave it up on 1 January 2026, when it adopted the euro, and Lithuania, Slovakia and the other euro members among the fast risers no longer have it either.
Greece at the other end
Greece records 108.5, the lowest in the Union — an 8.5% increase over five years against an EU average of 19.6%.
That is the continuation of the internal devaluation Greece went through after 2010, when wages were cut directly because the exchange rate could not be. Greek unit labour costs fell sharply in that period and have grown slowly since.
Read as competitiveness, this is a good result. Read alongside the rest of what this site records about Greece — the Union's second-lowest life satisfaction, its highest migrant over-qualification, a current account deficit of 5.7% of GDP and the most negative investment position in the Union — it is a reminder that cost competitiveness is one variable among many and does not by itself produce a strong economy.
Denmark and the productivity route
Denmark records 111.3, second-lowest, and it arrived there differently. Danish wages are among the highest in the Union and rose substantially over the period; Danish productivity rose with them.
That is the only route to low unit labour cost growth that does not involve suppressing pay, and Denmark is the clearest European example of it. Its current account surplus of 12.5% of GDP and creditor position of 103.3% are consistent with the same picture.
Why the base year matters
A 2020 base is not neutral. 2020 was the pandemic year, in which output collapsed while employment was held in place by short-time work schemes across the Union.
That mechanically raised unit labour costs in 2020 — the denominator fell faster than the numerator — so an index built on that base starts from an inflated level and understates subsequent growth. The comparison between Member States remains sound, because the effect applied to all of them, but the level of the index should not be read as a clean five-year change.
Nominal unit labour costs, 2025 (2020 = 100)
| Country | index, 2020 = 100 | Gap to EU averagepercentage points, derived |
|---|---|---|
| Hungary | 167.6 | +48.0 |
| Romania | 158.9 | +39.3 |
| Bulgaria | 157.5 | +37.9 |
| European Unionaggregate | 119.6 | — |
| Cyprus | 111.8 | −7.8 |
| Denmark | 111.3 | −8.3 |
| Greece | 108.5 | −11.1 |
What these figures cannot tell you
- The 2020 base is distorted
- 2020 combined collapsing output with employment held in place by short-time work schemes, which raised unit labour costs that year across the Union. An index on that base understates growth since. Comparisons between Member States remain valid; the absolute level does not.
- Nominal, not adjusted for exchange rates
- This is the nominal index in national terms. For Member States outside the euro area, competitiveness against the rest of the Union also depends on the exchange rate, which this measure does not include.
- A whole-economy average
- The index covers all activities together. A country can have rising costs in sheltered services and flat costs in tradable manufacturing, and the aggregate would show neither.
- Cost is not the whole of competitiveness
- Unit labour cost measures price competitiveness only. Product quality, specialisation and non-price factors determine export performance as much as cost, and none of them appear here.
Frequently asked questions
- What are unit labour costs?
- The labour cost of producing one unit of output. The measure rises when pay grows faster than productivity and falls when productivity grows faster than pay, which makes it the standard indicator of cost competitiveness.
- Which EU country has seen the fastest cost growth?
- Hungary, where unit labour costs stood at 167.6 in 2025 against a 2020 base of 100 — 68% higher in five years. Romania at 158.9 and Bulgaria at 157.5 follow. All three are lower-wage economies where wages are converging upwards.
- Which EU country has the slowest cost growth?
- Greece, at 108.5, followed by Denmark at 111.3. Greece arrived there through the internal devaluation that followed 2010; Denmark through productivity growth that matched high wage growth, which is the only route that does not involve suppressing pay.
- Is rapid wage convergence a problem?
- Not in itself — it is what economic integration is meant to produce. It becomes an imbalance when pay outpaces productivity, because exports then become more expensive relative to competitors, and inside the euro area that cannot be corrected by devaluation.
Methodological note
Eurostat publishes nominal unit labour costs in the national accounts framework as compensation per employee divided by real output per person employed. This study uses the index on a 2020 = 100 base for the whole economy.
Values are for 2025 and cover all 27 Member States.
The gap between the highest and lowest Member State is derived by Silver Data Lab. The comparisons with current account balances and net investment positions draw on the companion studies in this category, each with its own extraction.
Source data
The underlying series can be inspected and re-downloaded from the Eurostat data browser. The filters below are the ones applied.
Labour productivity and unit labour costs
nama_10_lp_ulc
- Filters applied:
- freq=A · unit=I20 · na_item=NULC_PER · time=2025
- Extracted:
- 2026-09-04
- Source last updated:
- 2026-09-03
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